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1. History and Introduction 5 
In most economic decisions where agents face uncertainties, no probabilities are available.  6 
This point was first emphasized by Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921), and was reiterated by 7 
Greenspan (2004): 8 
… how … the economy might respond to a monetary policy initiative may need to be 9 
drawn from evidence about past behavior during a period only roughly comparable to 10 
the current situation.  … In pursuing a risk-management approach to policy, we must 11 
confront the fact that only a limited number of risks can be quantified with any 12 
confidence.” (p. 38)   13 
Indeed, we often have no clear statistics available.  Knight went so far as to call probabilities 14 
unmeasurable in such cases.  Soon after Knight’s suggestion, Ramsey (1931), de Finetti 15 
(1931), and Savage (1954) showed that probabilities can be defined in the absence of 16 
statistics after all, by relating them to observable choice.   17 
 For example, P(E) = 0.5 can be derived from an observed indifference between receiving 18 
a prize under event E and receiving it under not-E (the complement to E).  Although widely 19 
understood today, the idea that something as intangible as a subjective degree of belief can be 20 
made observable through choice behavior, and can even be quantified precisely, was a major 21 
intellectual advancement. 22 
 Ramsey, de Finetti, and Savage assumed that the agent, after having determined the 23 
probabilities subjectively (as required by some imposed rationality axioms), proceeds as 24 
under expected utility for given objective probabilities.  The Allais (1953) paradox (explained 25 
later) revealed a descriptive difficulty: for known probabilities, people often do not satisfy 26 
expected utility.  Hence, we need to generalize expected utility.  Another, more fundamental 27 
difficulty was revealed by the Ellsberg (1961) paradox (also explained later): for unknown 28 
probabilities, people behave in ways that cannot be reconciled with any assignment of 29 
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subjective probabilities at all, so that further generalizations are needed.1  Despite the 30 
importance and prevalence of unknown probabilities, understood since 1921, and the 31 
impossibility of modeling these through subjective probabilities, understood since Ellsberg 32 
(1961), decision theorists continued to confine their attention to decision under risk with 33 
given probabilities until the late 1980s.  Wald’s (1950) multiple priors model did account for 34 
unknown probabilities, but received little attention. 35 
 As a result of an idea of David Schmeidler (1989, first version 1982), the situation 36 
changed in the 1980s.  Schmeidler introduced the first theoretically sound decision model for 37 
unknown probabilities without subjective probabilities, called rank-dependent utility or 38 
Choquet expected utility.  At the same time, Wald’s multiple priors model was revived when 39 
Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) established its theoretical soundness.  These discoveries 40 
provided the basis for nonexpected utility with unknown probabilities that had been sorely 41 
missing since 1921.  Since the late 1980s, the table has turned in decision theory.  Nowadays, 42 
most studies concern unknown probabilities.  Gilboa (2004) contains recent papers and 43 
applications.  This chapter will concentrate on conceptual issues of individual decisions in the 44 
absence of known probabilities. 45 
 Theoretical studies of nonexpected utility have usually assumed risk aversion for known 46 
probabilities (leading to concave utility and convex probability weighting), and ambiguity 47 
aversion for unknown probabilities (Camerer & Weber 1992, §2.3).  These phenomena best 48 
fit with the existence of equilibria and can be handled using conventional tools of convex 49 
analysis (Mukerji & Tallon 2001).  Empirically, however, a more complex fourfold pattern 50 
has been found.  For gains with moderate and high likelihoods, and for losses with low 51 
likelihoods, risk aversion is prevalent indeed, but for gains with low likelihoods and losses 52 
with high likelihoods the opposite, risk seeking, is prevalent. 53 
 The fourfold pattern resolves the classical paradox of the coexistence of gambling and 54 
insurance, and leads for instance to new views on insurance.  Whereas all classical studies of 55 
insurance explain the purchase of insurance through concave utility, empirical measurements 56 
of utility have suggested that utility is not very concave for losses, often exhibiting more 57 
convexity than concavity (surveyed by Köbberling, Schwieren, & Wakker 2006).  This 58 
finding is diametrically opposite to what has been assumed throughout the insurance 59 
literature.  According to modern decision theories, insurance is primarily driven by 60 
consumers’ overweighting of small probabilities, rather than by marginal utility.   61 
                                               
1
  The term “subjective probability” always refers to additive probabilities in this paper. 
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 The fourfold pattern found for risk has similarly been found for unknown probabilities, 62 
and usually to a more pronounced degree.  Central questions in uncertainty today concern 63 
how to analyze not only classical marginal utility but also new concepts such as probabilistic 64 
risk attitudes (how people process known probabilities), loss aversion and reference 65 
dependence (the framing of outcomes as gains and losses) and, further, states of belief and 66 
decision attitudes regarding unknown probabilities (“ambiguity attitudes”).   67 
 We end this introduction with some notation and definitions.  Decision under uncertainty 68 
concerns choices between prospects such as (E1:x1,…,En:xn), yielding outcome xj if event Ej 69 
obtains, j = 1,…,n.  Outcomes are monetary.  The Ejs are events of which an agent does not 70 
know for sure whether they will obtain, such as who of n candidates will win an election.  The 71 
Ejs are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  Because the agent is uncertain about which event 72 
obtains, he is uncertain about which outcome will result from the prospect, and has to make 73 
decisions under uncertainty. 74 
2. Decision under Risk and Non-Expected Utility through Rank 75 
Dependence 76 
 Because risk is a special and simple subcase of uncertainty (as explained later), this chapter 77 
on uncertainty begins with a discussion of decision under risk, where the probability pj = P(Ej) 78 
is given for each event Ej.  We can then write a prospect as (p1:x1,…,pn:xn), yielding xj with 79 
probability pj, j=1,…,n.  Empirical violations of expected-value maximization because of risk 80 
aversion (prospects being less preferred than their expected value) led Bernoulli (1738) to 81 
propose expected utility, ∑j=1
n  
pjU(xj), to evaluate prospects, where U is the utility function.  82 
Then risk aversion is equivalent to concavity of U.  83 
 Several authors have argued that it is intuitively unsatisfactory that risk attitude be modeled 84 
through the utility of money (Lopes 1987, p. 283).  It would be more satisfactory if risk attitude 85 
were also to be related to the way people feel about probabilities.  Economists often react very 86 
negatively to such arguments, based as they are on introspection and having no clear link to 87 
revealed preference.  Arguments against expected utility that are based on revealed preference 88 
were put forward by Allais (1953). 89 
90 
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Figure 1 displays preferences commonly found, with K denoting $1000:  100 
(0.06:25K, 0.07:25K, 0.87:0)      Ä (0.06:75K, 0.07:0, 0.87:0)  and   101 
(0.06:25K, 0.87:25K, 0.07:25K)  ê (0.06:75K, 0.87:25K, 0.07:0) . 102 
Preference symbols í,ê,Ä, and Ç are as usual.  We denote the outcomes in a rank-ordered 103 
manner, from best to worst.  In Fig. 1a, people usually prefer the "risky" (r) prospect because 104 
the high payment of 75K is attractive.  In Fig. 1b, people usually prefer the "safe" (s) 105 
certainty of 25K for sure.  These preferences violate expected utility because, after dropping 106 
the common (italicized) term 0.87U(0) from the expected-utility inequality for Fig. 1a and 107 
dropping the common term 0.87U(25K) from the expected-utility inequality for Fig. 1b, the 108 
two inequalities become the same.  Hence, under expected utility either both preferences 109 
should be for the safe prospect or both preferences should be for the risky one, and they 110 
cannot switch as in Figure 1.  The special preference for safety in the second choice (the 111 
certainty effect) cannot be captured in terms of utility.  Hence, alternative, nonexpected utility 112 
models have been developed. 113 
 Based on the valuable intuition that risk attitude should have something to do with how 114 
people feel about probabilities, Quiggin (1982) introduced rank-dependent utility theory.  The 115 
same theory was discovered independently for the broader and more subtle context of unknown 116 
probabilities by Schmeidler (1989, first version 1982), a contribution that will be discussed 117 
later.  A probability weighting function w : [0,1] → [0,1] satisfies w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1, and is 118 
strictly increasing and continuous.  It reflects the sensitivity of people towards probability.  119 
Assume that the outcomes of a prospect (p1:x1,…,pn:xn) are rank-ordered, x1 ≥ ... ≥ xn.  Then its 120 
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rank-dependent utility (RDU) is ∑j=1
n  
pijU(xj), where utility U is as before, and pij, the decision 121 
weight of outcome xj, is w(p1 + ... + pj) − w(p1 + ... + pj−1) (which is w(p1) for j=1). 122 
 Tversky & Kahneman (1992) adapted their widely used original prospect theory 123 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979) by incorporating the rank dependence of Quiggin and 124 
Schmeidler.  Prospect theory generalizes rank dependence by allowing different treatments of 125 
gains than of losses, which is desirable for empirical purposes.  In this chapter on uncertainty, I 126 
will focus on gains, in which case prospect theory in its modern version, sometimes called 127 
cumulative prospect theory, coincides with RDU.   128 
 With rank dependence, we can capture psychological (mis)perceptions of unfavorable 129 
outcomes being more likely to arise, in agreement with Lopes’ (1987) intuition.  We can also 130 
capture decision attitudes of deliberately paying more attention to bad outcomes.  An extreme 131 
example of the latter pessimism concerns worst-case analysis, where all weight is given to the 132 
most unfavorable outcome.  Rank dependence can explain the Allais paradox because the 133 
weight of the 0.07 branch in Fig. 1b may exceed that in Fig. 1a: 134 
 w(1) − w(0.93)  ≥  w(0.13) − w(0.06). (2.1) 135 
This inequality holds for w-functions that are steeper near 1 than in the middle region, a 136 
shape that is empirically prevailing indeed.   137 
 The following figures depict some probability weighting functions.  Fig. 2a concerns 138 
expected utility, and Fig. 2b a convex w, which means that 139 
 w(p+r) − w(r) (2.2) 140 
is increasing in r for all p ≥ 0.  This is equivalent to w´ being increasing, or w´´ being positive.  141 
Eq. 2.1 illustrates this property.  Eq. 2.2 gives the decision weight of an outcome occurring with 142 
probability p if there is an r probability of better outcomes.  Under convexity, outcomes receive 143 
more weight as they are ranked worse (i.e., r larger), reflecting pessimism.  It implies low 144 
evaluations of prospects relative to sure outcomes, enhancing risk aversion. 145 
 Empirical studies have found that usually w(p) > p for small p, contrary to what 146 
convexity would imply, and that w(p) < p only for moderate and high probabilities p 147 
(inverse-S; Abdellaoui 2000; Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000; Gonzalez & Wu 1999; Tversky & 148 
Kahneman 1992), as in Figs. 3a and 3b.  It leads to extremity-oriented behavior with both 149 
best and worst outcomes overweighted.  The curves in Figs. 3a and 3b also satisfy Eq. 2.1 150 
and also accommodate the Allais paradox.  They predict risk seeking for prospects that with a 151 
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small probability generate a high gain, such as in public lotteries.  The inverse-S shape 152 
suggests a cognitive insensitivity to probability, generating insufficient response to 153 
intermediate variations of probability and then, as a consequence, overreactions to changes 154 
from impossible to possible and from possible to certain.  These phenomena arise prior to any 155 
“motivational” (value-based) preference or dispreference for risk.  Extreme cases of such 156 
behavior are in Figure 4 (where we relaxed the continuity requirement for w). 157 
 158 
 159 
 160 
 161 
 162 
 163 
 164 
 165 
 166 
 167 
 168 
 169 
 170 
 Starmer (2000) surveyed nonexpected utility for risk.  The main alternatives to the rank-171 
dependent models are the betweenness models (Chew 1983; Dekel 1986), with Gul’s (1991) 172 
disappointment aversion theory as an appealing special case.  Betweenness models are less 173 
popular today than the rank-dependent models.  An important reason, besides their worse 174 
empirical performance (Starmer 2000), is that models alternative to rank-dependence did not 175 
provide concepts as intuitive as the sensitivity to probability/information modeled through 176 
RDU’s probability weighting w.  For example, consider a popular special case of betweenness, 177 
called weighted utility.  The value of a prospect is  178 
 
∑i=1
n  
pif(xi)U(xi)
∑j=1
n  
pjf(xj)
   (2.3) 179 
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for a function f : — → —+.  This new parameter f can, similar to rank dependence, capture 180 
pessimistic attitudes of overweighting bad outcomes by assigning high values to bad 181 
outcomes.  It, however, applies to outcomes and not to probabilities.  Therefore, it captures 182 
less extra variance of the data in the presence of utility than w, because utility also applies to 183 
outcomes.  For example, for fixed outcomes, Eq. 2.3 cannot capture the varying sensitivity to 184 
small, intermediate, and high probabilities found empirically.  Both pessimism and marginal 185 
utility are entirely specified by the range of outcomes considered without regard to the 186 
probabilities involved.  It seems more interesting if new concepts, besides marginal utility, 187 
concern the probabilities and the state of information of the decision maker rather than 188 
outcomes and their valuation.  This may explain the success of rank-dependent theories and 189 
prospect theory. 190 
3. Phenomena under Uncertainty that Naturally Extend 191 
Phenomena under Risk 192 
 The first approach to deal with uncertainty was the Bayesian approach, based on de 193 
Finetti (1931), Ramsey (1931), and Savage (1954).  It assumes that people assign, as well as 194 
possible, subjective probabilities P(Ej) to uncertain events Ej.  They then evaluate prospects 195 
(E1:x1,…,En:xn) through their (subjective) expected utility ∑j=1
n  
P(Ej)U(xj).  This model was 196 
the basis of Bayesian statistics and of much of the economics of uncertainty (Greenspan 197 
2004).  The empirical measurement of subjective probabilities has been studied extensively 198 
(Fishburn 1986; Manski 2004; McClelland & Bolger 1994).  We will confine our attention in 199 
what follows to models that were introduced in the last two decades, models that deviate from 200 
Bayesianism.  To Bayesians (including this author) such models are of interest for descriptive 201 
purposes. 202 
 Machina & Schmeidler (1992) characterized probabilistic sophistication, where a 203 
decision maker assigns subjective probabilities to events with unknown probabilities and then 204 
proceeds as for known probabilities.  The decision maker may, however, deviate from 205 
expected utility for known probabilities, contrary to the Bayesian approach, and Allais-type 206 
behavior can be accommodated. 207 
 The difference between objective, exogenous probabilities and subjective, endogenous 208 
probabilities is important.  The former are stable, and readily available for analyses, empirical 209 
tests, and communication in group decisions.  The latter can be volatile and can change at any 210 
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time by mere further thinking of the agent.  For descriptive studies, subjective probabilities 211 
may become observable only after complex measurement procedures.  Hence, I prefer not to 212 
lump objective and subjective probabilities together into one category, as has been done in 213 
several economic works (Ellsberg 1961 p. 645; Epstein 1999).  In this chapter, the term risk 214 
refers exclusively to exogenous objective probabilities.  Such probabilities can be considered 215 
a limiting case of subjective probabilities, just as decision under risk can be considered a 216 
limiting case of decision under uncertainty (Greenspan 2004, pp. 36-37).  Under a 217 
differentiability assumption for state spaces, Machina (2004) formalized this interpretation.  218 
Risk, while not occurring very frequently, is especially suited for applications of decision 219 
theory. 220 
 221 
 222 
 223 
 224 
 225 
 226 
 227 
 The Allais paradox is as relevant to uncertainty as it is to risk (MacCrimmon & Larsson 228 
1979, p. 364-365; Wu & Gonzalez 1999).  Figure 5 presents a demonstration by Tversky & 229 
Kahneman (1992, Section 1.3).  The analogy with Figure 1 should be apparent.  The authors 230 
conducted the following within-subjects experiment.  Let d denote the difference between the 231 
closing value of the Dow Jones on the day of the experiment and on the day after, where we 232 
consider the events H(igh): d > 35, M(iddle): 35 ≥ d ≥ 30, L(ow): 30 > d.  The total Dow 233 
Jones value at the time of the experiment was about 3000.  The right prospect in Fig. 5b is 234 
(H:75K, L:25K, M:0), and the other prospects are denoted similarly.  Of 156 money 235 
managers during a workshop, 77% preferred the risky prospect r in Fig. 5a, but 68% preferred 236 
the safe prospect s in Fig. 5b.  The majority preferences violate expected utility, just as they 237 
do under risk: After dropping the common terms P(L)U(0) and P(L)U(25K) (P denotes 238 
subjective probabilities), the same expected-utility inequality results for Fig. 5a as for Fig. 5b.  239 
Hence, either both preferences should be for the safe prospect, or both preferences should be 240 
for the risky one, and they cannot switch as in Figure 5.  This reasoning holds irrespective of 241 
what the subjective probabilities P(H), P(M), and P(L) are. 242 
FIGURE 5.  The certainty effect (Allais paradox) for uncertainty 
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 Schmeidler’s (1989) rank-dependent utility (RDU) can accommodate the Allais paradox 243 
for uncertainty.  We consider a weighting function (or nonadditive probability or capacity) W 244 
that assigns value 0 to the vacuous (empty) event ∅, value 1 to the universal event, and satisfies 245 
monotonicity with respect to set-inclusion (if A ⊃ B then W(A) ≥ W(B)).  Probabilities are 246 
special cases of weighting functions that satisfy additivity: W(A∪B) = W(A) + W(B) for 247 
disjoint events A and B.  General weighting functions need not satisfy additivity.  Assume that 248 
the outcomes of a prospect (E1:x1,…,En:xn) are rank-ordered, x1 ≥ ... ≥ xn.  Then the prospect’s 249 
rank-dependent utility (RDU) is ∑j=1
n  
pijU(xj) where utility U is as before, and pij, the decision 250 
weight of outcome xj, is W(E1 ∪ ... ∪ Ej) − W(E1 ∪ ... ∪ Ej−1) (pi1 = W(E1)).  The decision 251 
weight of xj is the marginal W contribution of Ej to the event of receiving a better outcome. 252 
 Quiggin’s RDU for risk is the special case with probabilities pj = P(Ej) given for all 253 
events, and W(Ej) = w(P(Ej)) with w the probability weighting function.  Tversky & 254 
Kahneman (1992) improved their 1979-prospect theory not only by avoiding violations of 255 
stochastic dominance, but also, and more importantly, by extending their theory from risk to 256 
uncertainty, by incorporating Schmeidler’s RDU. 257 
 Figure 5 can, just as in the case of risk, be explained by a larger decision weight for the 258 
M branches in Fig. 5b than in Fig. 5a: 259 
 W(M∪H∪L) − W(H∪L)  ≥  W(M∪H) − W(H). (3.1) 260 
This inequality occurs for W-functions that are more sensitive to changes of events near the 261 
certain universal event M∪H∪L than for events of moderate likelihood such as M∪H.  262 
Although for uncertainty we cannot easily draw graphs of W functions, their properties are 263 
natural analogs of those depicted in Figures 2-4.  W is convex if the marginal W contribution 264 
of an event E to a disjoint event R is increasing in R, i.e. 265 
 W(E∪R) − W(R) (3.2) 266 
is increasing in R (with respect to set inclusion) for all E.  This agrees with Eq. 3.1, where 267 
increasing R from H to H∪L leads to a larger decision weight for E = M.  Our definition is 268 
equivalent to other definitions in the literature such as W(A∪B) + W(A ∩ B) ≥ W(A) + 269 
W(B).2 270 
                                               
2
 Take E = A − B, and compare R = A ∩ B with the larger R = A. 
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 For probabilistic sophistication (W(.) = w(P(.)), convexity of W is equivalent to 271 
convexity of w under usual richness conditions, illustrating once more the close similarity 272 
between risk and uncertainty.  Eq. 3.2 gives the decision weight of an outcome occurring 273 
under event E if better outcomes occur under event R.  Under convexity, outcomes receive 274 
more weight as they are ranked worse (i.e., R larger), reflecting pessimism.  Theoretical 275 
economic studies usually assume convex W’s, implying low evaluations of prospects relative 276 
to sure outcomes. 277 
 Empirical studies have suggested that weighting functions W for uncertainty exhibit 278 
patterns similar to Fig. 3b, with unlikely events overweighted rather than, as convexity would 279 
have it, underweighted (Einhorn & Hogarth 1986; Tversky & Fox 1995; Wu & Gonzalez 280 
1999).  As under risk, we get extremity orientedness, with best and worst outcomes 281 
overweighted and lack of sensitivity towards intermediate outcomes (Chateauneuf, 282 
Eichberger, & Grant 2006; Tversky & Wakker 1995). 283 
4. Phenomena for Uncertainty That Do not Show up for Risk: the 284 
Ellsberg Paradox 285 
 Empirical studies have suggested that phenomena found for risk hold for uncertainty as 286 
well, and do so to a more pronounced degree (Fellner 1961, p. 684; Kahneman and Tversky, 287 
1979, p. 281), in particular regarding the empirically prevailing inverse-S shape and its 288 
extension to uncertainty (Abdellaoui, Vossmann, & Weber 2005; Kilka & Weber 2001; 289 
Weber 1994, pp. 237-238).  It is plausible, for example, that the absence of known 290 
probabilities adds to the inability of people to sufficiently distinguish between various 291 
degrees of likelihood not very close to impossibility and certainty.  In such cases, inverse-S 292 
shapes will be more pronounced for uncertainty than for risk.  This observation entails a 293 
within-person comparison of attitudes for different sources of uncertainty, and such 294 
comparisons will be the main topic of this section. 295 
 For Ellsberg’s paradox, imagine an urn K with a known composition of 50 red balls and 296 
50 black balls, and an ambiguous urn A with 100 red and black balls in unknown proportion.  297 
A ball is drawn at random from each urn, with Rk denoting the event of a red ball from the 298 
known urn, and the events Bk, Ra, and Ba defined similarly.  People prefer to bet on the 299 
known urn than on the ambiguous urn, and common preferences are: 300 
 11
  (Bk:100,Rk:0)  ê  (Ba:100,Ra:0)   and   (Bk:0,Rk:100)  ê (Ba:0,Ra:100).   301 
Such preferences are also found if people can themselves choose the color to bet on so that 302 
there is no reason for suspecting an unfavorable composition of the unknown urn.  Under 303 
probabilistic sophistication with probability measure P, the two preferences would imply 304 
P(Bk) > P(Ba)  and  P(Rk) > P(Ra).  However, P(Bk) + P(Rk) = 1 = P(Ba) + P(Ra)  yields a 305 
contradiction, because two big numbers cannot give the same sum as two small numbers.  306 
Ellsberg’s paradox consequently violates probabilistic sophistication and, a fortiori, expected 307 
utility.  Keynes (1921, p. 75) discussed the difference between the above two urns before 308 
Ellsberg did, but did not put forward the choice paradox and deviation from probabilistic 309 
sophistication as Ellsberg did.  We will now analyze the example assuming RDU. 310 
 In many studies of uncertainty, such as Schmeidler (1989), expected utility is assumed 311 
for risk, primarily for the sake of simplicity.  Then, W(Bk) = W(Rk) = 0.5 in the above 312 
example, with these W values reflecting objective probabilities.  Under RDU, the above 313 
preferences imply W(Ba) = W(Ra) < 0.5, in agreement with convex (or eventwise dominance, 314 
or inverse-S; for simplicity of presentation, I will confine my attention to convexity hereafter) 315 
weighting functions W.  This finding led to the widespread misunderstanding that it is 316 
primarily the Ellsberg paradox that implies convex weighting functions for unknown 317 
probabilities, a condition that was sometimes called ambiguity aversion.  I have argued above 318 
that it is the Allais paradox, and not the Ellsberg paradox, that implies these conclusions, and 319 
will propose another interpretation of the Ellsberg paradox hereafter, following works by 320 
Amos Tversky in the early 1990s. 321 
 First, it is more realistic not to commit to expected utility under risk when studying 322 
uncertainty.  Assume, therefore, that W(Bk) = W(Rk) = w(P(Bk)) = w(P(Rk)) = w(0.5) for a 323 
nonlinear probability weighting function.  It follows from the Ellsberg paradox that W(Ba) = 324 
W(Ra) < w(0.5).  This suggests: 325 
 326 
HYPOTHESIS.  In the Ellsberg paradox, the weighting function is more convex for the 327 
unknown urn than for the known urn.  ·  328 
 329 
 Thus, the Ellsberg paradox itself does not speak to convexity in an absolute sense, and 330 
does not claim convexity for known or for unknown probabilities.  It speaks to convexity in a 331 
relative (within-person) sense, suggesting more convexity for unknown probabilities than for 332 
known probabilities.  It is, for instance, possible that the weighting function is concave, and 333 
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not convex, for both known and unknown probabilities, but is less concave (and thus more 334 
convex) for the unknown probabilities (Wakker 2001, Section 6; cf. Epstein 1999 pp. 589-335 
590 or Ghirardato & Marinacci 2002, Example 25).   336 
 With only information about observed behavior, and without additional information 337 
about the compositions of the urns or the agent’s knowledge thereof, we cannot conclude 338 
which of the urns is ambiguous and which is not.  It would then be conceivable that urn K 339 
were ambiguous and urn A unambiguous, and that the agent satisfied expected utility for A 340 
and was optimistic or ambiguity seeking (concave weighting function, Eq. 3.2 decreasing in 341 
R) for K, in full agreement with the Ellsberg preferences.  Which of the urns is ambiguous 342 
and which is not is based on extraneous information, being our knowledge about the 343 
composition of the urns and about the agent’s knowledge thereof.  This point suggests that no 344 
endogenous definition of (un)ambiguity is possible. 345 
 The Ellsberg paradox entails a comparison of attitudes of one agent with respect to 346 
different sources of uncertainty.  It constitutes a within-agent comparison.  Whereas the 347 
Allais paradox concerns violations of expected utility in an absolute sense, the Ellsberg 348 
paradox concerns a relative aspect of such violations, finding more convexity (or eventwise 349 
dominance, or inverse-S) for the unknown urn than for the known urn.  Such a phenomenon 350 
cannot show up if we study only risk, because risk is essentially only one source of 351 
uncertainty.  Apart from some volatile psychological effects (Kirkpatrick & Epstein 1992; 352 
Piaget & Inhelder 1975), it seems plausible that people do not distinguish between different 353 
ways of generating objective known probabilities. 354 
 Uncertain events of particular kinds can be grouped together into sources of uncertainty.  355 
Formally, let sources be particular algebras of events, which means that sources are closed 356 
under complementation and union, and contain the vacuous and universal events.  For 357 
example, source A may concern the performance of the Dow Jones stock index tomorrow, 358 
and source B the performance of the Nikkei stock index tomorrow.  Assume that A from 359 
source A designates the event that the Dow Jones index goes up tomorrow, and B from 360 
source B the event that the Nikkei index goes up tomorrow.  If we prefer (A:100, not-A,0) to 361 
(B:100, not-B:0), then this may be caused by a special source preference for A over B, say if 362 
A comprises less ambiguity for us than B.  However, it may also occur simply because we 363 
think that event A is more likely to occur than event B.  To examine ambiguity attitudes we 364 
have to find a way to “correct” for differences in beliefs. 365 
 One way to detect source preference for A over B is to find an A-partition (A1,…,An) 366 
and a B-partition (B1,…,Bn) of the universal event such that for each j, (Aj:100, not-Aj,0) ê 367 
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(Bj:100, not-Bj:0) (Nehring 2001, Definition 4; Tversky & Fox 1995; Tversky & Wakker 368 
1995).  Because both partitions span the whole universal event, we cannot have stronger 369 
belief in every Aj than Bj (under some plausible assumptions about beliefs), and hence there 370 
must be a preference for dealing with A events beyond belief.  The Ellsberg paradox is a 371 
special case of this procedure. 372 
 Under the above approach to source preference, there is a special role for probabilistic 373 
sophistication.  For a source of ambiguity A for which not some of its events are more 374 
ambiguous than others, it is plausible that A exhibits source indifference with respect to 375 
itself.  This condition can be seen to amount to the additivity axiom of qualitative probability 376 
(if A1 is as likely as A3, and A2 is as likely as A4, then A1∪A2 is as likely as A3∪A4 whenever 377 
A1∩A2 = A3∩A4 = ∅), which, under sufficient richness, implies probabilistic sophistication 378 
under RDU, and does so in general (without RDU assumed) under an extra dominance 379 
condition (Fishburn 1986; Sarin & Wakker 2000).  Probabilistic sophistication, then, entails a 380 
uniform degree of ambiguity (with respect to source preference) of a source. 381 
 In theoretical economic studies it has usually been assumed that people are averse to 382 
ambiguity, corresponding with convex weighting functions.  Empirical studies, mostly by 383 
psychologists, have suggested a more varied pattern, where different sources of ambiguity 384 
can arouse all kinds of emotions.  For example, Tversky & Fox (1995) found that basketball 385 
fans exhibit source preference for ambiguous uncertain events related to basketball over 386 
events with known probabilities, which entails ambiguity seeking.  This finding is not 387 
surprising in an empirical sense, but its conceptual implication is important: attitudes towards 388 
ambiguity depend on many ad hoc emotional aspects, such as a general aversion to deliberate 389 
secrecy about compositions of urns, or a general liking of basketball.  Uncertainty is a large 390 
domain, and fewer regularities can be expected to hold universally for uncertainty than for 391 
risk, in the same way as fewer regularities will hold universally for the utility of nonmonetary 392 
outcomes (hours of listening to music, amounts of milk to be drunk, life duration, etc.) than 393 
for the utility of monetary outcomes.  It means that there is much yet to be discovered about 394 
uncertainty. 395 
396 
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5. Models for Uncertainty Other than Rank-Dependence 396 
    397 
5.1. Multiple Priors 398 
 An interesting model of ambiguity by Jaffray (1989), with a separation of ambiguity 399 
beliefs and ambiguity attitudes, received, unfortunately, little attention.  A surprising case of 400 
unknown probabilities can arise when the expected utility model perfectly well describes 401 
behavior, but utility is state-dependent.  The (im)possibility of defining probability in such 402 
cases has been widely discussed (Drèze 1987; Grant & Karni, 2005; Nau 2006). 403 
 The most popular alternative to Schmeidler’s RDU is the multiple priors model 404 
introduced by Wald (1950).  It assumes a set of probability measures P plus a utility function 405 
U, and evaluates each prospect through its minimal expected utility with respect to the 406 
probability distributions contained in P.  The model has an overlap with RDU: If W is 407 
convex, then RDU is the minimal expected utility over P where P is the CORE of W, i.e. the 408 
set of probability measures that eventwise dominate W.  Drèze (1961, 1987) independently 409 
developed a remarkable analog of the multiple priors model, where the maximal expected 410 
utility is taken over P, and P reflects moral hazard instead of ambiguity.  Drèze also provided 411 
a preference foundation.  Similar functionals appear in studies of robustness against model 412 
misspecification in macroeconomics (Hanssen & Sargent, 2001). 413 
 Variations of multiple priors, combining pessimism and optimism, employ convex 414 
combinations of the expected utility minimized over P and the expected utility maximized 415 
over P (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, & Marinacci 2004, Proposition 19).  Such models can 416 
account for extremity orientedness, as with inverse-S weighting functions and RDU.  Arrow 417 
& Hurwicz (1972) proposed a similar model where a prospect is evaluated through a convex 418 
combination of the minimal and maximal utility of its outcomes (corresponding with P being 419 
the set of all probability measures).  This includes maximin and maximax as special cases.  420 
Their approach entails a level of ambiguity so extreme that no levels of belief other than 421 
“sure-to-happen,” “sure-not-to-happen,” and “don’t know” play a role, similar to Figure 4, 422 
and suggesting a three-valued logic.  Other non-belief-based approaches, including minimax 423 
regret, are in Manski (2000) and Savage (1954), with a survey in Barberá, Bossert, & 424 
Pattanaik (2004).  425 
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 Other authors proposed models where for each single event a separate interval of 426 
probability values is specified (Budescu & Wallsten 1987; Kyburg 1983; Manski 2004).  427 
Such interval-probability models are mathematically different from multiple priors because 428 
there is no unique relation between sets of probability measures over the whole event space 429 
and intervals of probabilities separately for each event.  The latter models are more tractable 430 
than multiple priors because probability intervals for some relevant event are easier to specify 431 
than probability measures over the whole space, but these models did not receive a preference 432 
foundation and never became popular in economics.  Similar models of imprecise 433 
probabilities received attention in the statistics field (Walley 1991). 434 
 Wald’s multiple priors model did receive a preference axiomatization (Gilboa & 435 
Schmeidler 1989), and consequently became the most popular alternative to RDU for 436 
unknown probabilities.  The evaluating formula is easier to understand at first than RDU.  437 
The flexibility of not having to specify precisely what “the” probability measure is, while 438 
usually perceived as an advantage at first acquaintance, can turn into a disadvantage when 439 
applying the model.  We then have to specify exactly what “the” set of probability 440 
distributions is, which is more complex than specifying only one probability measure exactly 441 
(cf. Lindley 1996). 442 
 The simple distinction between probability measures that are either possible (contained 443 
in P) or impossible (not contained in P), on the one hand adds to the tractability of the 444 
model, but on the other hand cannot capture cognitive states where different probability 445 
measures are plausible to different degrees.  To the best of my knowledge, the multiple priors 446 
model cannot yet be used in quantitative empirical measurements today, and there are no 447 
empirical assessments of sets of priors available in the literature to date.  Multiple priors are, 448 
however, well suited for general theoretical analyses where only general properties of the 449 
model are needed.  Such analyses are considered in many theoretical economic studies, where 450 
the multiple priors model is very useful.   451 
 The multiple priors model does not allow deviations from expected utility under risk, and 452 
a desirable extension would obviously be to combine the model with nonexpected utility for 453 
risk.  Promising directions for resolving the difficulties of the multiple priors model are being 454 
explored today (Maccheroni, Marinacci, & Rustichini 2005). 455 
5.2. Model-Free Approaches to Ambiguity 456 
 Dekel, Lipman, & Rustichini (2001) considered models where outcomes of prospects are 457 
observed but the state space has not been completely specified, as relevant for incomplete 458 
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contracts.  Similar approaches with ambiguity about the underlying states and events 459 
appeared in psychology in repeated-choice experiments by Herwig et al. (2003), and in 460 
support theory (Tversky & Koehler 1994).  This section discusses two advanced attempts to 461 
define ambiguity model-free that have received much attention in the economic literature. 462 
 In a deep paper, Epstein (1999) initiated one such approach, continued in Epstein & 463 
Zhang (2001).  Epstein sought to avoid any use of known probabilities and tried to 464 
endogenize (non)ambiguity and the use of probabilities.3  For example, he did not define risk 465 
neutrality with respect to known probabilities as we did above, but with respect to subjective 466 
probabilities derived from preferences as in probabilistic sophistication (Epstein 1999, Eq. 467 
2.2).  He qualified probabilistic sophistication as ambiguity neutrality (not uniformity as done 468 
above).  Ghirardato & Marinacci (2002) used another approach that is similar to Epstein’s.  469 
They identified absence of ambiguity not with probabilistic sophistication, as did Epstein, 470 
but, more restrictively, with expected utility. 471 
 The above authors defined an agent as ambiguity averse if there exists another, 472 
hypothetical, agent who behaves the same way for unambiguous events, but who is ambiguity 473 
neutral for ambiguous events, and such that the real agent has a stronger preference for sure 474 
outcomes4 versus ambiguous prospects than the hypothetical agent.  This definition concerns 475 
traditional between-agent within-source comparisons (Yaari 1969).  The stronger preferences 476 
for certainty are, under rank-dependent models, equivalent to eventwise dominance of 477 
weighting functions, leading to nonemptiness of the CORE (Epstein 1999, Lemma 3.4; 478 
Ghirardato & Marinacci 2002, Corollary 13).  These definitions of ambiguity aversion are not 479 
very tractable because of the "there exists" clause.  It is difficult to establish which ambiguity 480 
neutral agent to take for the comparisons.  To mitigate this problem, Epstein (1999, Section 481 
4) proposed eventwise derivatives as models of local probabilistic sophistication.  Such 482 
derivatives only exist for continua of events with a linear structure, and are difficult to elicit.  483 
They serve their purpose only under restrictive circumstances (ambiguity aversion throughout 484 
plus constancy of the local derivative, called coherence; see Epstein’s Theorem 4.3). 485 
 In both above approaches, ambiguity and ambiguity aversion are inextricably linked, 486 
making it hard to model attitudes towards ambiguity other than aversion, or to distinguish 487 
between ambiguity-neutrality or -absence (Epstein 1999, p. 584 1st para; Epstein & Zhang, p. 488 
283; Ghirardato & Marinacci 2002, p. 256, 2nd para).  Both approaches have difficulties 489 
                                               
3
 He often used the term uncertainty as equivalent to ambiguity. 
4
 Or unambiguous prospects, but these can be replaced by their certainty equivalents. 
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distinguishing between the two Ellsberg urns.  Each urn in isolation can be taken as 490 
probabilistically sophisticated with, in our interpretation, a uniform degree of ambiguity, and 491 
Epstein’s definition cannot distinguish which of these is ambiguity neutral (cf. Ghirardato & 492 
Marinacci 2002, middle of p. 281).  Ghirardato & Marinacci’s definition can, but only 493 
because it selects expected utility (and the urn generating such preferences) as the only 494 
ambiguity-neutral version of probabilistic sophistication.  Any other form of probabilistic 495 
sophistication, i.e. any nonexpected utility behavior under risk, is then either mismodeled as 496 
ambiguity attitude (Ghirardato & Marinacci 2002, pp. 256-257), or must be assumed not to 497 
exist. 498 
 We next discuss in more detail a definition of (un)ambiguity by Epstein & Zhang (2001), 499 
whose aim was to make (un)ambiguity observable by expressing it directly in terms of a 500 
preference condition.  They called an event E unambiguous if 501 
 (E:c,  E2:γ,E3:β,E4:x4,…,En:xn) í (E:c, E2:β,E3:γ,E4:x4,…,En:xn)  implies  502 
  (E:c ,´E2:γ,E3:β,E4:x4,…,En:xn) í (E:c ,´E2:β,E3:γ,E4:x4,…,En:xn)  (5.1) 503 
for all partitions E2,…,En of not-E, and all outcomes c, c ,´ γ í β, x4,…,xn, with a similar 504 
condition imposed on not-E.  In words, changing a common outcome c into another common 505 
outcome c´ under E does not affect preference, but this is imposed only if the preference 506 
concerns nothing other than to which event (E2 or E3) a good outcome γ is to be allocated 507 
instead of a worse outcome β.  Together with, mainly, their Axiom 4, which the authors 508 
interpret as richness, Eq. 5.1 implies that probabilistic sophistication holds on the set of 509 
events satisfying this condition, which in the interpretation of the authors designates absence 510 
of ambiguity (rather than uniformity).  As we will see next, it is not clear why Eq. 5.1 would 511 
capture the absence of ambiguity.   512 
 513 
EXAMPLE. Assume that events are subsets of [0,1), E = [0, 0.5), not-E = [0.5, 1), and E has 514 
unknown probability pi.  Every subset A of E has probability 2piλ(A) (λ is the usual Lebesgue 515 
measure, i.e. the uniform distribution over [0,1)) and every subset B of not-E has probability 516 
2(1−pi)λ(B).  Then it seems plausible that event E and its complement not-E are ambiguous, 517 
but conditional on these events ("within them") we have probabilistic sophistication with 518 
respect to the conditional Lebesgue measure and without any ambiguity.  Yet, according to 519 
Eq. 5.1, events E and not-E themselves are unambiguous, both preferences in Eq. 5.1 being 520 
determined by whether λ(E2) exceeds λ(E3).  · 521 
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 522 
 In the example, the definition in Eq. 5.1 erroneously ascribes the unambiguity that holds 523 
for events conditional on E, so “within E,” to E as a whole.  Similar examples can be devised 524 
where E and not-E themselves are unambiguous, there is "nonuniform" ambiguity conditional 525 
on E, this ambiguity is influenced by outcomes conditional on not-E through nonseparable 526 
interactions typical of nonexpected utility, and Eq. 5.1 erroneously ascribes the ambiguity 527 
that holds within E to E as a whole. 528 
 A further difficulty with Eq. 5.1 is that it is not violated in the Ellsberg example with 529 
urns A and K as above (nor if the uncertainty regarding each urn is extended to a "uniform" 530 
continuum as in Example 5.8ii of Abdellaoui & Wakker 2005), and cannot detect which of 531 
the urns is ambiguous.  The probabilistic sophistication that is obtained in Epstein & Zhang 532 
(2001, Theorem 5.2) for events satisfying Eq. 5.1, and that rules out the two-urn Ellsberg 533 
paradox and its continuous extension of Abdellaoui & Wakker (2005), is mostly driven by 534 
their Axioms 4 and 5 and the necessity to consider also intersections of different-urn events 535 
for E2, …,En in Eq. 5.1 (see their Appendix E).  This imposes, in my terminology, a 536 
uniformity of ambiguity over the events satisfying Eq. 5.1 which, rather than Eq. 5.1 itself, 537 
rules out the above counterexamples. 538 
5.3. Multi-Stage Approaches to Ambiguity 539 
 Several authors have considered two-stage approaches with intersections of first-stage 540 
events Ai, i = 1,…,l and second-stage events Kj, j = 1,..,k, so that n = lk events AiKj result, 541 
and prospects (AiKj:xij)i=1l  j=1
k
 are considered.  It can be imagined that in a first stage it is 542 
determined which event Ai obtains, and then in a second stage, conditional on Ai, which 543 
event Kj obtains.  Many authors considered such two-stage models with probabilities given 544 
for the events in both stages, the probabilities of the first stage interpreted as ambiguity about 545 
the probabilities of the second stage, and non-Bayesian evaluations used (Levi 1980; Segal 546 
1990; Yates & Zukowski 1976).   547 
 Other authors considered representations  548 
 ∑i=1
l Q(Ai)ϕ(∑j=1k P(Kj)U(xij)) (5.2) 549 
for probability measures P and Q, a utility function U, and an increasing tranformation ϕ.  550 
For ϕ the identity or, equivalently, ϕ linear, traditional expected utility with backwards 551 
induction results.  Nonlinear ϕ’s give new models.  Kreps & Porteus (1979) considered Eq. 552 
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5.2 for intertemporal choice, interpreting nonlinear ϕ’s as nonneutrality towards the timing of 553 
the resolution of uncertainty.  Ergin & Gul (2004) and Nau (2006) reinterpreted the formula, 554 
where now the second-stage events are from a source of different ambiguity than the first-555 
stage events.  A concave ϕ, for instance, suggests stronger preference for certainty, and more 556 
ambiguity aversion, for the first-stage uncertainty than for the second.   557 
 Klibanoff, Marinacci, & Mukerji (2005) considered cases where the decomposition into 558 
A- and K-events is endogenous rather than exogenous.  This approach greatly enlarges the 559 
scope of application, but their second-order acts, i.e. prospects with outcomes contingent on 560 
aspects of preferences, are hard to implement or observe if those aspects cannot be related to 561 
exogenous observables.   562 
 Eq. 5.2 has a drawback similar to Eq. 2.3.  All extra mileage is to come from the 563 
outcomes, to which also utility applies, so that there will not be a great improvement in 564 
descriptive performance or new concepts to be developed. 565 
6. Conclusion 566 
 The Allais paradox reveals violations of expected utility in an absolute sense, leading to 567 
convex or inverse-S weighting functions for risk and, more generally, for uncertainty.  The 568 
Ellsberg paradox reveals deviations from expected utility in a relative sense, showing that an 569 
agent can deviate more from expected utility for one source of uncertainty (say one with 570 
unknown probabilities) than for another (say, one with known probabilities).  It demonstrates 571 
the importance of within-subject between-source comparisons. 572 
 The most popular models for analyzing uncertainty today are based on rank-dependence, 573 
with multiple priors a popular alternative in theoretical studies.  The most frequently studied 574 
phenomenon is ambiguity aversion.  Uncertainty is, however, a rich empirical domain, with a 575 
wide variety of phenomena, and with ambiguity aversion and ambiguity insensitivity 576 
(inverse-S) as prevailing but not universal patterns.  The possibility of relating the properties 577 
of weighting functions for uncertainty to cognitive interpretations such as insensitivity to 578 
likelihood-information makes RDU and prospect theory well suited for links with other fields 579 
such as psychology, artificial intelligence (Shafer 1976), and brain imaging studies (Camerer, 580 
Loewenstein, & Prelec 2004). 581 
 582 
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